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INTRODUCTION
On June 11, 1999, the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA")' de-
cided In re R-A-,2 and reversed an immigration judge's grant of asy-
lum to Rodi Alvarado-Pefia ("Ms. Alvarado"). Ms. Alvarado is a
Guatemalan woman who fled to the United States after more than ten
I. See PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF, EXEC. OFF. IMMIGR. REV. (Dec. 1998) (on file
with author) (providing an overview of the background, responsibilities, organiza-
tion, and organization goals of the Executive Office for Immigration Review
("EOIR"), which includes the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA")). The BIA is
the administrative body that reviews the decisions made by immigration judges.
See id. The BIA's decisions are binding on all immigration judges throughout the
United States, unless they are overruled or modified by a United States Court of
Appeal or the United States Attorney General. See id.
2. Interim Decision 3403, 1999 WL 424364, at *1 (B.I.A. June 11, 1999)
(publication page references not available for this document). The page numbers
cited in this Comment are referenced to the hard copy printed from Westlaw.
3. See In the Matter of Alvarado-Pefia, No. A73-753-922 (EXEC. OFF.
IMMIGR. REV. Sept. 20, 1996) (finding that Ms. Alvarado established a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of membership in a particular social group
and actual or imputed political opinion). Immigration Judge Mimi Schooley Yam,
sitting in an immigration court in San Francisco, California, granted asylum to
Rodi Alvarado-Pefia on September 20, 1996. See id.
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years of egregious abuse at the hands of her husband." Although her
flight was prompted by the unwillingness of Guatemalan government
officials to respond to her pleas for help,5 ultimately Ms. Alvarado
fled to the United States because she believed that her only chances
of escaping her husband were to flee or die.'
In overturning Ms. Alvarado's grant of asylum, a ten-member
majority of the BIA reversed the positive progress of gender-based
persecution claims' under United States asylum law and the United
States Department of Justice's "Gender Guidelines."" The BIA ma-
4. See In re R-A-, 1999 WL 424364, at *2-4 (recounting undisputed testi-
mony and statements of abuse by Ms. Alvarado).
5. See id. at *8 (acknowledging that Ms. Alvarado established the Guatemalan
government's failure to protect her); see also Brief of Amici Curiae, Refugee Law
Center and International Human Rights/Migration Project In Support of Respon-
dent's Response to Government's Appeal at 23-28; In the Matter of Alvarado-
Pefia, No. A73-753-922 (EXEC. OFF. IMMIGR. REV. Sept. 20, 1996) (arguing that
the Guatemalan government's inability or unwillingness to protect Ms. Alvarado
from her spouse created a well-founded fear of future persecution).
6. See In the Matter of Alvarado-Pefia, No. A73-753-922, at 4 (explaining that
Ms. Alvarado believed her only choices were to flee or die, in part because of her
husband's military connections and knowledge of the Guatemalan countryside).
7. See Fredric N. Tulsky, Asylun Denied for Abused Girl: Ruling of.Ippeals
Panel is Assailed, WASH. POST, July 4, 1999, at A3 [hereinafter Tulsky, As'lum
Denied for Abused Girl] (quoting Wendy Young, staff attorney for the Women's
Commission for Refugee Women and Children). "We now may be entering the
dark ages for the adjudication of gender- and aged-based persecution cases." Il.
8. See Phyllis Coven, Office of International Affairs, Department of Justice,
Memorandum on Considerations For Asylum Qfficers Adjudicating Asyihun Claims
From Women, May 26, 1995, reprinted in 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 781 (June 5,
1995) [hereinafter United States Gender Guidelines] (promulgating a set of gender
guidelines for the United States, in the wake of other significant gender guidelines
issued by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR") in
1991 and Canada in 1993); see also Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada
Guideline 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution.
Guidelines Issued by the Chairperson Pursuant to Section 65(3) of the Immigra-
tion Act. UPDATE, Nov. 25, 1996 [hereinafter Canadian Gender Guidelines] (ad-
vocating that gender-related persecution fits within the definition of a refugee);
UNHCR, Guidelines on Protection of Refigee Women, paras. 54, 71 (1991)
[hereinafter UNHCR Gender Guidelines], reprinted in REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY:
SELECTED STATUTES, REGULATIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS 394, 397
(Karen Musalo et al. eds., 1998) (recognizing that even though gender is not a
separate grounds for establishing refugee status under the 1951 Convention Relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees, the social group category should include women who
fear persecution on account of their gender).
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jority determined that even though the abuse Ms. Alvarado suffered
rose to the level of persecutive harm 9 and the Guatemalan govern-
ment offered her no protection, '° the immigration judge erred in or-
dering a grant of asylum. According to the BIA majority, the abuse
Ms. Alvarado suffered did not satisfy at least one of the five statuto-
rily mandated grounds" of the nexus requirement." The nexus re-
quirement, which obligates all individuals seeking asylum to prove
that they were persecuted because of their race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, often
poses a barrier to domestic violence victims. 3
9. See In re R-A-, 1999 WL 424364, at *8 (agreeing with the Immigration
Judge's conclusion that the harm Ms. Alvarado suffered more than sufficiently met
the threshold requirement of persecutive harm in determining eligibility for asylum
under United States asylum law).
10. See id. (agreeing with the Immigration Judge's conclusion that the Guate-
malan government ignored Ms. Alvarado's requests for assistance).
11. See Immigration and Nationality Act sec. 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C.A. sec.
1 101(a)(42) (West 1999) (codifying five "on account of' elements: race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion). Specifi-
cally, Ms. Alvarado argued persecutive harm "on account of either actual or im-
puted political opinion or membership in a particular social group." See In re R-A-,
1999 WL 424364, at *8.
12. See In re R-A-, 1999 WL 424364, at *13-16 (setting forth the nexus re-
quirement). There must be a nexus between the persecutive harm alleged by the
asylum seeker and one of the five statutorily-mandated elements of the definition
of a refugee. See id.; see also INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482-83 (1992)
(interpreting "on account of' to mean the persecution suffered must be on account
of the victim's political opinion and not his persecutors'); STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY,
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 845 (2d ed. 1997) (arguing that in
standard English the phrase "on account of' means "because of' and immigration
judges, the BIA, the United States Courts of Appeal, and the United States Su-
preme Court should interpret "on account of' as "because of'). Legomsky further
noted that when Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"),
with the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
("IIRAIRA") section 305(a), it changed "on account of' in INA section 241(b)(3)
to "because of." See id. The wording was amended for "independent reasons," and
the conference committee report made no mention of the change. See id.
13. See infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text (discussing the challenge the
nexus requirement poses for domestic violence victims, which is absent in CAT).
See, e.g., Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1239-40 (3d Cir. 1993) (upholding BIA's de-
nial of asylum and withholding of removal to an Iranian woman who failed to es-
tablish her membership in a particular social group). Fatin successfully identified a
particular social group--"Iranian women who refuse to conform to the govern-
ment's specific laws and social norms"-but failed to establish her membership in
898 [15:895
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Currently, In re R-A- is on appeal to the Ninth Circuit,"' which will
continue to adjudicate the nexus issue in determining whether to re-
instate Ms. Alvarado's grant of asylum.'5 While asylum remains an
available legal remedy for domestic violence victims, there is also a
new legal remedy available in the United States: withholding of re-
moval under Article 3 of the United Nations Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment ("CAT").' 6 On October 21, 1998, President Clinton signed
into law the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 199817
("F.A.R.R.A."). Section 2242(b) of F.A.R.R.A."' requires the
United States to implement its obligations under Article 3 of CAT.'"
this particular social group or successfully prove that forced compliance would rise
to the level of persecution. See Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1241-42. But see, e.g., In re
Kasinga, Interim Decision 3278, 1996 WL 379826, at *8 (B.I.A. June 13, 1996)
(granting asylum to a Togolese woman fleeing female genital mutilation whose
particular social group was defined, at least in part, by gender).
14. See Order at 1, Rodi Alvarado Pena v. INS (Sept. 30, 1999) (No. 99-70823)
(staying the proceedings before the Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit, at peti-
tioner Ms. Alvarado's request, until Jan. 28, 2000) (copy on file with author). But
see infra note 15 (noting that co-counsel of In re R-A- requested another stay,
pending a determination by Attorney General Janet Reno, as to whether she will
certify and reverse the BIA's decision).
15. See E-mail from Karen Musalo, Esq., Co-counsel, Appeal of In re R-A-, to
Barbara Alexander, Author, "Convention Against Torture: A Viable Alternative
Legal Remedy for Domestic Violence Victims" (Jan. 23, 2000) (on file with
author) (stating that Ms. Alvarado's counsel would request, and expected to re-
ceive, another stay with the Ninth Circuit, extending the Jan. 28, 2000 deadline to
file briefs, while Attorney General Janet Reno considers whether or not to certify
the case).
16. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, art. 3, S. Treaty
Doe. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 113, 114 [hereinafter Convention Against
Torture].
17. See Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998).
18. See id. sec. 2242(b) (requiring implementation regulations no later than 120
days post-enactment). These implementing regulations are "subject to any reserva-
tions, understandings, declarations, and provisos contained in the United States
resolution of ratification of the [CAT]." Id. sec. 2242(c).
19. See 136 CONG. REC. S17,486 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (declaring that Arti-
cles 1-16 of CAT are not self-executing). This means that CAT was not effective
in United States domestic law until it was explicitly implemented by the United
States Congress. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1364 (6th ed. 1990) (defining
2000] 899
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Significantly, Article 3 of CAT prohibits the expulsion, refoule-
ment, or extradition of any "person to another state where there are
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture."20 CAT does not provide, however, the legal
permanent resident or citizenship benefits of asylum, and it does not
allow family members to come to the United States to join their
spouses or parents." CAT relief is significant because it prevents the
United States from returning women, such as Ms. Alvarado, to hus-
bands who will continue to torture them.22 Accordingly, CAT is an
important and viable alternative legal remedy for domestic violence
victims."
The consequent Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS")
Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, which took
effect on March 22, 1999, established formal procedures for filing
and adjudicating claims under CAT.2 4 In the wake of In re R-A-,2 5
withholding of removal under Article 3 of CAT 6 provides an alter-
"self-executing" as "anything which is effective immediately, without the need of
any type of implementing action"). Id.
20. Convention Against Torture, supra note 16, art. 3, 1465 U.N.T.S. at 114.
21. See infra Part II.A (comparing asylum with CAT relief).
22. See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of
CAT's refoulement provision).
23. See infra Part III.B (analyzing how domestic violence victims, such as Ms.
Alvarado, qualify for CAT relief).
24. Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg.
8478 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 8 C.F.R).
25. See Fredric N. Tulsky, Abused Woman Is Denied Asylum; Immigration
Ruling Reflects Split Over Gender Persecution, WASH. POST, June 20, 1999, at A I
[hereinafter Tulsky, Abused Woman is Denied Asylum] (stating that the BIA's de-
cision in R-A- reflects growing concern about a possible floodgates scenario if do-
mestic violence is included as persecution on account of membership in a particu-
lar social group).
26. See Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg.
8478, 8489 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 8 C.F.R.) (establishing with-
holding of removal and deferral of removal under Article 3 of CAT); see also Jo-
seph E. Langlois, Acting Director, Asylum Division, INS, Memorandum on Im-
plementation of Amendments to Asylum and Withholding of Removal
Regulations, Effective March 22, 1999 (Mar. 18, 1999) [hereinafter INS Imple-
mentation Memorandum] (providing general background of CAT, summary of
changes, and procedural guidance for implementation for asylum officer directors,
supervisory asylum officers, quality assurance and training coordinators, and asy-
900 [15:895
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native legal remedy for ensuring the non-refoulement of domestic
violence victims. 7
This Comment addresses the importance and viability of with-
holding of removal under Article 3 of CAT as an alternative legal
remedy for domestic violence victims fleeing egregious abuse at the
hands of their spouses.2 Part I provides an overview of CAT's pur-
pose, its arrival on the international scene as well as its implementa-
tion in the domestic immigration law of the United States both before
and after March 22, 1999. Part I further explains how egregious do-
mestic violence2' qualifies as both persecution and torture. "
Part II compares the legal remedy of asylum with the newly avail-
able legal remedy of withholding of removal under Article 3 of CAT.
In addition, Part II analyzes the ways in which withholding of re-
moval under Article 3 of CAT both broadens and narrows the scope
of relief available to domestic violence victims. Specifically, it ad-
dresses the absence of a nexus requirement in CAT relief, the differ-
ent harms that asylum and CAT address, and the different burdens of
proof that domestic violence victims must satisfy under asylum and
withholding of removal under Article 3 of CAT.
Part Ill provides a case study of h re R-A-, analyzing the areas of
CAT in which domestic violence victims, such as Ms. Alvarado, may
encounter difficulties in qualifying for withholding of removal under
Article 3 of CAT. After analyzing the severe physical and mental
lum officers).
27. See Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Department of Justice,
Supplemental Instructions to Form 1-589 Application for Asylum and Withholding
of Removal (Form 1-589S), OMB No. 1115-0086 (1999) [hereinafter INS Supple-
mental Instructions] (indicating that the immigration judge first determines if the
applicant qualifies for asylum or withholding of removal and then, if the person
does not qualify, if the applicant qualifies for relief under CAT).
28. See iufra Parts II.B, III.B (discussing the differences between proving eli-
gibility for withholding of removal under Article 3 of CAT and proving eligibility
for a grant of asylum under INA section 208(a) for domestic violence victims).
29. See generally General Recommendation No. 19, Committee on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, para. 23, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/19921L.1/Add. 1 (1992) [hereinafter General Recommendation No. 191
(defining family/domestic violence as physically, mentally, and sexually violent
acts that family members commit against women).
30. See infra notes 35-74 and accompanying text (discussing the background
and purpose of CAT and its relevancy to domestic violence).
2000]
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pain and suffering that Ms. Alvarado endured, including numerous
instances of rape and sodomy as well as continuous death threats,
Part III demonstrates that the difficulties in qualifying for withhold-
ing of removal under Article 3 of CAT are surmountable. Finally,
Part III argues that Ms. Alvarado satisfies the burden of proof for
withholding of removal under Article 3 of CAT.
Part IV recommends four areas for improvement that the INS and
the United States Congress should consider in order to ensure that
domestic violence victims are not erroneously returned to their home
countries. First, Part IV recommends that the INS amend its regula-
tions under 8 C.F.R. sec. 208.16(c)(3) to recognize the difficulties
that arise when trying to gather corroborating evidence of torture.3'
Second, Part IV recommends that the INS amend its regulations un-
der 8 C.F.R. sec. 208.18(a) to include Article 1(2) of CAT, which
suggests that immigration advocates can rely on relevant provisions
from other international treaties for support.32 Third, Part IV recom-
mends that the INS amend its regulations under 8 C.F.R. sec.
208.18(a) to explain that the term "acquiescence" means public offi-
cials can play a passive rather than active role in torture." Finally,
Part IV recommends that the United States Congress should legislate
an Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") provision, similar to the
special rule for battered spouses or children under INA section
240A(b)(2), that would allow domestic violence victims who re-
ceived withholding of removal under Article 3 of CAT to adjust to
legal permanent resident status.34 This Comment concludes that
withholding of removal under Article 3 of CAT provides an impor-
tant and viable alternative legal remedy for domestic violence vic-
tims seeking asylum. Nonetheless, improvements are needed to en-
sure that CAT relief is consistently reliable as an alternative legal
remedy for all domestic violence victims whose egregious abuse
31. See infra notes 226-28 and accompanying text (discussing first recommen-
dation to improve CAT relief for domestic violence victims).
32. See infra notes 229-33 and accompanying text (suggesting other improve-
ments to CAT relief for domestic violence victims).
33. See infra notes 234-37 and accompanying text (considering one means of
improving CAT relief for domestic violence victims).
34. See infra notes 238-45 and accompanying text (recommending to the
United States Congress a legislative improvement to CAT relief for domestic vio-
lence victims).
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constitutes torture.
I. THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE
Between 1977 and 1984, the United States participated in drafting
CAT, an instrument designed to strengthen the prohibition against
torture already in existence in international law." The impetus to
draft and adopt CAT arose from the recognition that prohibiting tor-
ture is a part of customary international law and the desire to rein-
force this prohibition in a treaty dedicated solely to torture and other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishmentl In addition,
this impetus arose in reaction to an international outcry that States
were not taking their obligations to prohibit torture seriously." Until
March 22, 1999, the United States did not implement its obligation
under CAT in its domestic law." With implementing legislation now
in place, and contingent upon the successful recognition of egregious
domestic violence as a form of torture, CAT can provide a viable al-
ternative legal remedy for domestic violence victims who fail to
qualify for asylum.3 9
A. PROHIBITION AGAINST TORTURE
Customary international law obligates all States to prohibit tor-
ture.' This obligation exists regardless of whether a State has signed
35. See inifra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (discussing United States' in-
volvement in the arrival of CAT on the international scene).
36. See in fra notes 40-46 and accompanying text (discussing the prohibition
against torture).
37. See infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text (providing a brief overview
of the international dimension of CAT).
38. See infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text (explaining past and present
implementation in United States domestic law).
39. See infra notes 61-74 (discussing the status of domestic violence as a form
of torture).
40. See Report on Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, submitted by Sir Nigel Rodley, Special Rapporteur of the Commis-
sion on Human Rights, in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 53/139,
U.N. Comm'n H.R., Agenda Item 116(a), para. 9, U.N. Doc. A/54/426 (1999)
[hereinafter 1998 UN Torture Report] (noting that CAT, the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights ("UDHR") affirm the non-derogable right to be free from torture).
2000]
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CAT or attached any reservations, declarations, and understandings
to the instrument of ratification. Currently, the Committee Against
Torture monitors State compliance with CAT.42 Other regional hu-
man rights instruments such as the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("European
Convention on Human Rights") and the American Convention on
Human Rights also enforce the international customary law prohibi-
tion against torture.43 The implementing bodies for each of these
Conventions, including the European Commission of Human Rights
("ECHR"), the European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR"),u4 the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights ("IACHR"), and the
The prohibition against torture, as articulated in the ICCPR and the UDHR, is now
a norm of customary international law. See id.; see also International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 171
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR] (reaffirming in Article 7
that the prohibition against torture is a fundamental human right); Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/811
(Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR] (establishing in Article 5 a universal right to
be free from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment). See
generally IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 512-17 (4th
ed. 1990) (discussing the concept ofjus cogens); Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF
RIGHTS 19 (1990) (arguing that torture is widely accepted as a matter of customary
international law). There are also other regional instruments that recognize the
prohibition against torture and serve as useful bodies of law to help interpret CAT.
See i fra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
41. See JOSE MARIA RUDA, THE FINAL ACCEPTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTIONS 8 (The Stanley Foundation, 1976) (explaining ratification in a con-
stitutional system such as the United States). Ratification is "the full approval of
the legislative branch." Id. Specifically, the United States Senate must give its con-
sent to every treaty and convention the President of the United States signs. See id.
42. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 16, arts. 17-24, 1465 U.N.T.S.
at 116-21 (establishing a Committee Against Torture and defining its scope and
power).
43. See American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 5(2), 9
I.L.M. 673, 676 (1970) (looking to the Charter of the Organization of American
States, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and the
UDHR); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 224 (1953) [hereinafter
European Convention on Human Rights] (incorporating the UDHR's prohibition
against torture).
44. See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 43, arts. 19-56,
213 U.N.T.S. at 234-48 (establishing the ECHR and the ECtHR and their jurisdic-
tion and rules of procedure).
[15:895
CONVENTION A GA INST TORTL RE
Inter-American Court of Human Rights ("IACtHR")," could provide
useful guidance for interpreting the obligation to prohibit torture un-
der CAT, as each of these implementing bodies has functioned
longer than the Committee Against Torture."
B. CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: INTERNATIONAL &
DOMESTIC
CAT originated in a discussion of torture in the United Nations
General Assembly in 1973, in response to the international outcry
concerning the alarming spread of torture as a tool of repression in
autocratic regimes throughout the world . CAT is a multilateral
treaty whose principal aim is to reinforce the prohibition of torture
under customary international law.' Although the United States sup-
ported the idea of drafting a convention against torture and other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and partici-
pated in the Working Group sessions, "' it did not deposit its instru-
ment of ratification for CAT until October 21, 1994." Furthermore,
its instrument of ratification included several reservations, declara-
45. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 43, arts. 34-73, 9
I.L.M. at 685-94 (establishing the IACHR and the IACtHR and their jurisdiction
and rules of procedure).
46. See, e.g., Andrew Dutton, The Year of the CA T: The Importance ofCA. T's
European cousin (visited Sept. 30, 1999) <http://ww.asylumlaw.org/legaltools,
unitedstates/legal-standardslusCAT/usCAT2.htm> (maintaining that article
1(2) of CAT makes ECHR and ECtHR decisions relevant and useful for the BIA
and United States federal courts interpreting and applying CAT).
47. See J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR
PUNISHMENT 13 (1988) (reviewing the background to the 1973 and 1974 UN Gen-
eral Assembly discussions on the question of torture).
48. See id. at 12 (discussing the inclusion of torture prohibition in international
standards); see also supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing the right to
be free from torture as customary international law).
49. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 47, at 40 (including the United
States in the list of countries that supported drafting a convention against torture
and participated in the February 1979 pre-sessional Working Group deliberations).
50. See The United Nations Treaty Collection (visited Sept. 25, 1999)
<http://w-v.un.org/Depts/Treaty/final/ts2/newfiles/part-boo 'ivboo/iv_9.html>
(noting that the United States instrument of ratification for CAT took effect on
Nov. 20, 1994).
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tions, and understandings, which undermined the effectiveness of
ratification without further congressional legislation enforcing it.5'
Prior to March 22, 1999, in compliance with the United States'
treaty obligations under Article 3 of CAT,52 the INS informally proc-
essed requests. 3 These requests, however, were not considered until
the applicant exhausted his or her legal remedies before an immigra-
tion judge and the BIA14 On March 22, 1999, however, in response
to the October 21, 1998 legislation implementing CAT in United
States domestic law, the INS issued the Regulations Concerning the
Convention Against Torture, which replaced the informal process
with formal procedures and legal remedies."
51. See 136 CONG. REC. S17,486 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (setting forth United
States reservations, declarations, and understandings to CAT for ratification). Spe-
cifically, the United States Senate gave its advice and consent subject to the decla-
ration that "Articles 1 through 16 of the Convention [Against Torture] are not self-
executing." Id. pt. III (1). For further discussion on the impact of the United States
Senate's understandings on withholding of removal under Article 3 of CAT on
domestic violence victims, see Part III.B infra.
52. See INS Implementation Memorandum, supra note 26 (summarizing, inter
alia, the procedural and substantive changes as a result of CAT implementing leg-
islation). The United States' obligation to comply with CAT existed even before
Nov. 20, 1994 (thirty days after depositing its ratification with the Secretary-
General), but not until Oct. 21, 1998 was there any implementing the United
States' obligations. See id.
53. See DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 570-72
(Paul T. Lufkin ed., 3d ed. 1999) (discussing informal procedures for CAT relief).
The asylum-seeker could make the request at any point during the asylum process,
but the INS was unable to address the claim until the asylum-seeker had exhausted
all other legal remedies. An asylum officer conducted an interview and made an
assessment, which was then referred to a supervisory asylum officer. If the super-
visory asylum officer determined the assessment contained sufficient information
to resolve the claim, the supervisory asylum officer referred the claim to the INS
Central Office Asylum Division. The INS Central Office Asylum Division, upon
determining the record was complete, then forwarded the claim to the INS Office
of the General Counsel, which made the final decision as to whether to grant with-
holding of removal under Article 3 of CAT. See id. (noting that the procedures
were rudimentary).
54. See id. (explaining the procedure for processing CAT claims prior to Mar.
22, 1999).
55. See Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg.
8478, 8478 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 8 C.F.R.) (amending INS in-
formal procedures and replacing them with formal procedures required by section
2242(b) of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998).
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Consequently, there are currently four categories of legal remedies
available to immigrant domestic violence victims: (1) asylum; (2)
withholding of removal under INA section 241(b)(3); (3) withhold-
ing of removal under Article 3 of CAT; and (4) deferral of removal
under CAT.56 The first two categories, asylum and withholding of
removal under INA section 241(b)(3)17 remain unchanged by the
adoption of CAT. The Convention provides two additional legal
remedies: withholding of removal under Article 3 of CAT and defer-
ral of removal under Article 3 of CAT." Withholding of removal un-
der both asylum law and CAT prevents the United States from extra-
diting, returning, or expelling any individual to a country where he or
she would face a "more likely than not" risk of torture. 9 As with-
holding of removal only provides for non-return, and not permission
to remain in the United States indefinitely, it is an alternative legal
remedy to pursuing a grant of asylum.60
C. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AS TORTURE: AN OVERVIEW
The threshold issue in determining whether CAT is a viable alter-
native legal remedy for domestic violence victims is the United
States government's willingness to recognize that particularly egre-
gious domestic violence constitutes torture. 2 Currently, there is a
56. See id. at 8478-81 (discussing withholding of removal under INA section
241(b)(3), withholding of removal under CAT, and deferral of removal under
CAT). These remedies are not exclusive to domestic violence victims. This Com-
ment does not focus on the fourth legal remedy, deferral of removal under CAT,
because the traditional domestic violence victim does not fall within the category
of persons that the deferral of removal remedy is designed to protect. See id. at
8481.
57. 8 U.S.C.A. sec. 1231(b)(3) (West 1999).
58. See Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg.
8478, 8480 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 8 C.F.R.) (outlining the struc-
ture of the rule).
59. See infra notes 78-80 (providing codified law provisions of withholding of
removal).
60. See Part II.A infra (comparing asylum with CAT relief).
61. See Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women. its
Causes and Consequences, Ms. Radhika CoomaraswamY, Submitted in Accor-
dance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1995/85, U.N. Comm'n
H.Rt, para. 23, U.N. Doe. EICN.4/1996/53 (1996) [hereinafter 1995 Report of the
Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women] (defining domestic violence as
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dearth of United States case law examining domestic violence under
the Article 1 torture definition in CAT.63 While the dissent in In re R-
"violence that occurs within the private sphere, generally between individuals who
are related through intimacy, blood, or law"); see also Report of the Special Rap-
porteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences, Ms. Radhika
Coomaraswamy, submitted in accordance with Commission on fluman Rights
Resolution 1995/85: A Framework for Model Legislation on Domestic Violence,
U.N. Comm'n H.R., para. 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/53/Add.2 (1996) [hereinaf-
ter Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women: Framework for Model Leg-
islation on Domestic Violence] (identifying several acts, among others, that con-
stitute domestic violence). Those acts include:
simple assault, aggravated physical battery, kidnapping, threats, intimidation,
coercion, stalking, humiliating verbal abuse, forcible or unlawful entry, arson,
destruction of property, sexual violence, marital rape, dowry or bride-price
related violence, female genital mutilation, violence related to exploitation
through prostitution, violence against household workers and attempts to
commit such acts ....
Id.
62. See discussion infra Part III.B (analyzing CAT relief for domestic violence
victims); see also Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women.
its Causes and Consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, submitted in accor-
dance with Commission resolution 1997/44, U.N. Comm'n HR., 54th Sess., Provi-
sional Agenda Item 9(a), pt. III.B.1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/54 (1998) [hereinaf-
ter 1997 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women]
(recognizing that gender-based violence violates the right to be free from torture
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment). Domestic violence is recog-
nized, however, as a form of persecution. See In re R-A-, 1999 WL 424364, at *8
(agreeing with immigration judge that domestic violence suffered by Ms. Alvarado
rose to the level of persecutive harm); see also Bemma Donkoh, Deputy Regional
Representative, UNHCR, Regional Office Washington, Remarks at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace briefing on In re R-A- (July 28, 1999) (stating
that domestic violence can be a form of persecution) (transcript on file with
author). See generally Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, para. 18,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (1993) (emphasizing that gender-based violence con-
stitutes a human rights violation).
63. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 16, art. I, para. 1, 1465
U.N.T.S. at 113-14 (defining torture); see also Center for Gender and Refugee
Studies, Case Summaries, Listed by Claimed Asyhm Ground (last modified Nov.
12, 1999) <http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/summaries/ground.html#torture> (pro-
viding case summaries of seven cases in which asylum applicants sought alterna-
tive CAT relief). One case summary involving domestic violence is In re R-A-;
Ms. Alvarado's counsel have filed a motion to reopen her case with the BIA, pur-
suant to CAT. See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reopen and Remand
Pursuant to the Convention Against Torture at 9, In re R-A-, Interim Decision
3403, 1999 WL 424364 (B.I.A. June 11, 1999) [hereinafter CAT Support Memo-
randum] (arguing that Ms. Alvarado is entitled to CAT relief); see also Center for
Gender and Refugee Studies, Case Summary 76; Gender Asylum Case Stummarv
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A- implied that egregious domestic violence may constitute a form of
torture, it did not provide extensive legal analysis on this issue.'" The
United States government must recognize, however, that some forms
of gender-based torture, such as egregious domestic violence, are
less readily apparent than others, such as the systematic rape of
women by soldiers during war.6'
At one time, an analogous situation existed under United States
asylum law. Neither the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees66 ("1951 Convention") nor the 1967 Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees ("1967 Protocol") " conceptualized the do-
mestic violence victim as someone in need of international protec-
tion.68 Yet, by 1975, the BIA had begun to adjudicate domestic vio-
lence asylum claims.69 Since then, a body of case law involving
domestic violence has developed, analyzing the domestic violence
nexus issue in the context of the membership in a particular social
group framework.70 Although CAT does not explicitly conceptualize
the domestic violence victim as a torture victim, other international
human rights instruments, such as the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women" ("CEDAW"), the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights7- ("UDHR"), and the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights' ("ICCPR"), include
principles of international law relevant to domestic violence vic-
tims.
74
(last modified Nov. 12, 1999) <http:f/vww.uchastings.edicgrs.summaries sum-
mary76.html> (noting a case that includes a CAT claim that was not in the deci-
sion where on Feb. 23, 1999 an immigration judge granted asylum to a woman
who opposed the practice of female genital mutilation and as a result suffered do-
mestic abuse at the hands of her husband).
64. See In re R-A-, 1999 WL 424364, at *29 (Guendelsberger, Board Member,
dissenting), citing Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everydqay;
Domestic Violence as Torture, 25 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. RE'. 291, 303-06 (1994)
(noting that domestic violence is a powerful tool by which men oppress and "sys-
tematically destroy the power of women"). See id.
65. See generally Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment (draft resolution), U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 54th Sess., Agenda Item
116(a), para. 13, U.N. Doc. A/RES/C.3/54/L.50 (1999) (inviting the Special Rap-
porteur on Torture to continue examining the torture of women and the circum-
stances under which it occurs). The draft mentions gender-specific torture such as
rape, but not domestic violence. See id.
66. See United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened
for signature July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 629, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (1954) [hereinafter
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1951 Convention] (setting forth the definition of a refugee and State Parties' obli-
gations under international law).
67. See United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for
signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Pro-
tocol] (amending and expanding the 1951 Convention).
68. But see Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (1981)
[hereinafter CEDAW] (conveying agreement of State Parties to provide legal pro-
tection against discrimination for women by both private and public actors); Decla-
ration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 104, U.N.
GAOR 3d Comm., 48th Sess., Agenda Item 111, at I, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104
(1994) (affirming that violence against women is a human rights violation which
States should take all appropriate measures to eliminate). For further support af-
firming domestic violence victims as individuals in need of international protec-
tion, see generally UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No. 73 (XLIV):
Refugee Protection and Sexual Violence (1993) (recognizing that persecution suf-
fered by women is different than that suffered by men); Rhonda Copelon, Recog-
nizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as Torture, 25 COLUM.
HUM. RTs. L. REV. 291, 306-52 (1994) (analyzing domestic violence through the
lens of torture); Donkoh, supra note 62 (discussing domestic violence in the con-
text of the refugee definition and concluding that "certain victims of domestic vio-
lence can be included in the refugee definition") (transcript on file with author).
69. See Matter of Pierre, Interim Decision 2433, 15 I. & N. Dec. 461, 462-63
(B.I.A. 1975) (denying withholding of deportation under INA section 243(h) to a
Haitian woman for failure to establish the "on account of "element as well as the
Haitian government's inability or unwillingness to control her husband). Respon-
dent fled to the United States after her husband, a Haitian government official,
tried to kill her by burning her house down. See id.
70. See, e.g., Rusovan v. INS, No. 97-2819, 1998 WL 78999, at *1 (7th Cir.
Feb. 19, 1998) (denying asylum to a Serbian woman because she failed to show the
government condoned her husband's abuse on account of her membership in a
particular social group); Alcantara v. INS, No. 92-70286, 1993 WL 43869, at * I
(9th Cir. Feb. 22, 1993) (distinguishing domestic violence arising from personal
motivation, which does not qualify as persecution under United States asylum law,
from persecution on account of one of five statutorily-mandated grounds); Matter
of A and Z, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Office of the Immigration
Judge, Arlington, VA (Dec. 20, 1994) (granting asylum to a Jordanian woman
fleeing 30 years of domestic violence suffered on account of her political opinion
and her membership in the particular social group of women espousing Western
values and refusing to live under male domination).
71. See CEDAW, supra note 67, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 13.
72. See UDHR, supra note 40, at art. 5 (declaring the right to be free from tor-
ture).
73. See ICCPR, supra note 40, 999 U.N.T.S. at 171 (supporting the customary
international law norm of prohibiting torture); see also infra note 74.
74. See ICCPR, supra note 40, 999 U.N.T.S. at arts. 7, 23(2), (4), 26 (recog-
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II. EVALUATING AVAILABLE LEGAL REMEDIES
Although there are currently four legal remedies available for per-
sons hoping to enter and remain in the United States," asylum is al-
ways the preferred form of relief.7' This is because asylum consti-
tutes permission to remain in the United States permanently, rather
than only on a temporary basis.? Conversely, withholding of re-
moval, which is available under both asylum law 6 and CAT, A only
prevents the United States from extraditing, expelling, or returning
an alien to a country where he or she would face a "more likely than
not" risk of torture. 0 Although asylum provides benefits that CAT
relief does not, the latter is still an important and viable alternative
legal remedy.8' Withholding of removal under CAT provides domes-
nizing rights similar to those provided by UDHR articles 5, 16(i) and (3), and 7);
UDHR, supra note 40, 999 U.N.T.S. at arts. 2, 3, 5 (recognizing the "'right to life,
liberty, and security of person. . ." and the right to be free from "torture or other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment", without distinction of any
kind, such as... sex"). Moreover, the ICCPR specifically recognizes the right to
marry and the obligations of State Parties "to ensure equality of rights and respon-
sibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution ...."
ICCPR, supra note 40, at arts. 23(2), (4); see also CEDAW, supra note 67, 1249
U.N.T.S. at 1 (defining discrimination against women).
75. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text (discussing the four legal
remedies currently available to aliens seeking residency in the United States).
76. See generally 8 U.S.C.A. sec. 1158 (West 1999) (codifying United States
asylum procedure). Asylum is a discretionary form of relief. See 8 U.S.C.A. sec.
1158(b)(1). Asylum allows an alien present in the United States, who qualifies as a
refugee under 8 U.S.C.A. sec. 1 101(a)(42)(A), to remain in and work in the United
States. See 8 U.S.C.A. sec, 1158(a)(1), (c)(1)(B). If granted asylum, the asylee may
apply to adjust to legal permanent resident status after having been physically pre-
sent in the United States for one year. See 8 U.S.C.A. sec. 1159(a)(l)(B) (West
1999). After five years, if the asylee becomes a legal permanent resident, he or she
can apply to become a United States citizen. See 8 U.S.C.A. sec. 1427(a) (West
1999).
77. See generally LEGOMSKY, supra note 12, at 768-71 (providing a brief over-
view of asylum and non-return).
78. See 8 U.S.C.A. sec. 1231(b)(3) (West 1999) (codifying INA section
241(b)(3), which establishes the legal remedy of withholding of removal).
79. See 8 C.F.R. sec. 208.16(c) (1999) (codifying withholding of removal as a
legal remedy under CAT).
80. See 8 C.F.R. sec. 208.16(f) (1999) (establishing that withholding of re-
moval under CAT does not prevent return to a "safe" third country).
81. See infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of
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tic violence victims an additional opportunity, using different crite-
ria, to demonstrate the compelling reasons why the United States
should not expel them.82
A. COMPARING ASYLUM WITH CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE RELIEF
Currently, asylum provides three significant benefits for domestic
violence victims that CAT relief does not.83 First, asylum is a basis
for adjustment of status to become a legal permanent resident
("LPR").84 Legal permanent residence is not an option for domestic
violence victims who meet the definition of torture and qualify for
asylum not provided by the withholding of removal under CAT).
82. See infra notes 98-133 and accompanying text (discussing the absence of a
nexus requirement and the definition of torture under CAT). The burden of proof
of withholding of removal under both asylum law and CAT is "more likely than
not." See 8 C.F.R. sec. 208.16(b), (c) (1999). Immigration reform advocates, how-
ever, believe that the United States should also limit humanitarian immigration, in
addition to other types of immigration. See, e.g., STEVEN A. CAMAROTA, CENTFER
FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, IMPORTING POVERTY: IMMIGRATION'S IMPACT ON THE
SIZE AND GROWTH OF THE POOR POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (Sept. 2,
1999) (arguing that the United States should only resettle those genuinely in need
because of persecution). Camarota argues that immigration is a major factor in
poverty growth in the United States. See id. at 1. Camarota further argues that im-
migrants are "almost without exception, a net drain on public coffers." Id. Immi-
gration restrictionists also put forward other arguments for stemming what they
perceive as the unabated and harmful flow of immigrants into the United States.
One argument is that immigrants are out-breeding Americans. See George J. Bor-
jas, The Top Ten Symptoms of Immigration, in BACKGROUNDER 2 (Center for Im-
migration Studies Series, Nov. 1999) (arguing that immigration costs outweigh
benefits). According to immigration restrictionists, such as the Federation for
American Immigration Reform ("FAIR"), population growth fueled by immigra-
tion is threatening the ecological stability of the United States. See Peter Ff.
Schuck, The Treatment of Aliens in the United States, in PATHS TO INCLUSION:
THE INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY 208-09
(Peter H. Schuck & Rainer Miinz eds., 1998) (stating that principled restrictionism
rather than xenophobia and nativism predominates in the United States today).
Other arguments include: immigrants are unskilled and their earnings lag behind
those of Americans for very long periods of time; immigrants take jobs from lower
skilled Americans; immigrants are more likely to receive welfare; and immigrants
harm the economy by dragging down wages. See id.
83. See infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text (discussing three of the major
differences between asylum and CAT relief).
84. See 8 C.F.R. sec. 208.16(f) (1999) (establishing that withholding of re-
moval under CAT does not prevent return to a "safe" third country).
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withholding of removal under CAT." Therefore, while the INS can-
not remove a domestic violence victim who qualifies for CAT relief
to a country of risk, a grant of withholding of removal under CAT
does not automatically allow a domestic violence victim to remain in
the United States indefinitely. Second, asylum provides family
members of the asylee, located outside of the United States, an op-
portunity to join their spouses and/or parents in the United States. "
Third, asylum allows family members already in the United States,
such as children who fled with the domestic violence victim, to re-
main.8 Withholding of removal under CAT does not provide any of
these benefits.89
B. BROADENING AND NARROWING: THE SEE-SAW
EFFECT
In order for a domestic violence victim to receive CAT relief as an
alternative legal remedy to asylum, she must prove: (1) that the harm
she would face, if she is returned to the country from which she fled,
qualifies as torture under Article 1 of CAT,9? and (2) that she faces a
"more likely than not" risk of torture if she is returned? The fol-
85. See generally ANKER, supra note 53, at 470 (reiterating that relief under
Article 3 of CAT is non-refoulement relief only).
86. See 8 C.F.R sec. 208.16(f) (1999) (including removal to third country pro-
visions in CAT and INA section 241(b)(3)(B) withholding of removal implement-
ing regulations).
87. Cf 8 C.F.R. sec. 208.16(e) (1999) (noting that withholding of removal un-
der CAT prevents a spouse and minor children from joining the asylee, but pro-
viding reconsideration for those individuals whose request for asylum was denied
"solely in the exercise of discretion").
88. See 8 C.F.R. sec. 208.20(c) (establishing that a person receiving a grant of
asylum, who has a spouse or minor children in the United States, but did not in-
clude the spouse or children in the asylum application, can file an 1-730 to adjust
statuses of spouse and minor children).
89. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text (discussing benefits exclu-
sive to asylum).
90. See infi-a note 104 (defining torture for the purposes of CAT relief).
91. See 8 C.F.R. sec. 208.16(c) (1999) (codifying withholding of removal un-
der Article 3 of CAT). Withholding of removal under CAT utilizes the same stan-
dard of proof ("more likely than not"), the same removal prohibitions, and the
same mandatory bars as withholding of removal under INA section 24 1(b)(3)(B).
See 8 C.F.R. see. 208.16(b), (d). One difference between the two forms of with-
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lowing subsections will analyze three integral components of CAT to
demonstrate how domestic violence victims can qualify for CAT re-
lief.92
First, CAT contains no nexus requirement." This means domestic
violence victims need not prove that the torture suffered was "on ac-
count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group or political opinion." 94 This is significant because the nexus
requirement is a very challenging hurdle that domestic violence vic-
tims face when trying to qualify for asylum. 95 Second, the definition
of torture in Article 1 of CAT differs from the working definition of
persecution, which is the harm with which asylum law is concerned."'
Third, the burden of proof CAT establishes, although it does not dif-
fer from withholding of removal under asylum law, differs from a
holding of removal is the types of harm from which the person is protected-tor-
ture as defined in Article 1 of CAT and persecution as interpreted by the UNHCR
and construed in United States case law. Cf 136 CONG. REC. S17,491-92 (daily ed.
Oct. 27, 1990) (adopting an understanding that, "where there are substantial
grounds that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture" in Article 3 of
CAT, the test is whether it is "more likely than not that he would be tortured").
92. See infra Part II.B.1-3 (analyzing three integral components of CAT). See
generally ANKER, supra note 53, at 469-70, 479-81, 509-10 (analyzing asylum and
CAT comparatively in terms of the scopes of each being broader or narrower in
certain areas than the other). This author has coined the term "see-saw effect" to
emphasize how CAT requirements interact with one another, and also to highlight
the role that the United States government plays, as a type of fulcrum, in deter-
mining the scope of CAT relief. See id.
93. See infra note 100 and accompanying text (explaining why there is no
nexus requirement in CAT).
94. Compare infra note 104 (providing the definition of torture under CAT),
with 8 U.S.C.A. sec. 1158(a)(2)(A) (West 1999) (codifying the "on account of"
language).
95. See, e.g., supra notes 9-12 (explaining that in In re R-A-, even though Ms.
Alvarado was persecuted and the Guatemalan government offered no assistance,
Ms. Alvarado did not qualify for asylum because she could not satisfy the "on ac-
count of' nexus requirement).
96. Compare infra note 104 (providing the verbatim text of the CAT torture
definition), with United Nations, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee
Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees (2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter UNHCR Handbook] (providing interpretation





1. Absence of Nexus Requirement Broadens Scope of Relief
First, CAT does not have a nexus requirementY Specifically, CAT
does not include the "on account of race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership in a social group or political opinion" language, which is in-
cluded in the refugee definition in Article l(A)(2) of the 1951 Con-
vention and Article 1(2) of the 1967 Protocol.' Consequently,
individuals seeking relief under CAT do not need to prove the un-
derlying reasons for the torture they suffered.'O'
Paragraph 1 of Article 3"01 of CAT draws in part on Article 33 of
97. See infra notes 98-140 and accompanying text (discussing the absence of a
nexus requirement, the definitions of torture and the "public official", interpreting
the terms consent and acquiescence, and the burden of proof in CAT relief). I have
applied the term the "see-saw" effect to emphasize that the United States govern-
ment represents the fulcrum on which the balance between broadening and nar-
rowing the scope of CAT relief is determined. See supra note 92 (explaining the
term "see-saw" effect). The principles already exist to ensure that CAT relief is not
erroneously narrowed in the case of domestic violence victims. See infra notes 98-
108 and accompanying text (showing the absence of a nexus requirement under
CAT, which broadens the scope of the relief). The United States government must
now provide its agencies with the support upon which they can act as levers to se-
cure the internationally-recognized right of non-return for those at risk of torture.
See discussion infra Part IV. A-D (recommending certain changes to ensure CAT
relief as a viable remedy for domestic violence victims).
98. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 47, at 118 (maintaining that the
words "such purposes as" in Article 1 of CAT mean the purposes listed are not ex-
haustive).
99. Compare Convention Against Torture, supra note 16, arts. 1, 3, 146
U.N.T.S. at 113-14 (providing a non-exhaustive list of possible purposes for which
torture is inflicted and establishing State Parties' obligations not to expel, return, or
extradite persons at substantial risk of being tortured), with 1951 Convention, su-
pra note 66, art. 1(A)(2), 189 U.N.T.S. at 152 (establishing that to qualify as a
refugee, persecution must be on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group or political opinion). The 1967 Protocol amended the
refugee definition in the 1951 Convention, removing the words -[a]s a result of
events occurring before 1 January 1951" and "as a result of such events." 1967
Protocol, supra note 67, art. 1(2), 606 U.N.T.S at 268 (retaining the "on account
of" component of the definition of a refugee).
100. Cf BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 47, at 118 (noting that Article I of
CAT makes no mention of any particulars concerning torture victims).
101. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 16, art. 3, pam. 1, 1465
U.N.T.S. at 114 (stating that "No State shall expel, return (refouler) or extradite a
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the 1951 Convention,"2 which the United States Congress codified in
the Refugee Act of 1980.3 Article 33, Paragraph 1 absolutely pro-
hibits States from expelling, returning, or extraditing any individual
to a country where it is more likely than not that they would face a
risk of torture. ' ° Article 3 of CAT does not require the individual to
prove that the torture suffered was "on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group or political
opinion."'' 5 Instead, the definition of torture under Article 1 of CAT
recognizes that torture is intentionally inflicted for any number of106 d
reasons. Hence, domestic violence victims do not have to prove the
harm they suffered was on account of one of only five reasons.0 7 As
person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he
would be in danger of being subjected to torture.").
102. See 1951 Convention, supra note 66, art. 33, para. I, 189 U.N.T.S. at 176
(stating that "No contracting State shall expel or return (refouler) a refugee in any
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would
be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a par-
ticular social group or political opinion.").
103. See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102.
104. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 16, art. 1, para. 1, 1465
U.N.T.S. at 113-14 (defining torture). Article 1, Paragraph I defines torture as
follows:
[T]he term "torture" means any act by which severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a conftssion,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of
having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for
any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering
is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a
public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not in-
clude pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions.
Id. (emphasis added) [hereinafter Article 1 Torture Definition]. The CAT Hand-
book confirms the intent of the drafters that Article 3 constitutes an absolute prohi-
bition against expelling, returning, or extraditing a person to a country where he or
she would more likely than not face a risk of torture. See BURGERS & DANELIUS,
supra note 47, at 125-28 (providing annotations on the provisions of CAT).
105. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 47, at 125 (comparing Article 33 of
1951 Convention with Article 3 of CAT).
106. See Article 1 Torture Definition, supra note 104 (broadening the acceptable
definition of torture).
107. Cf In re R-A-, 1999 WL 424364, at *13-16 (analyzing the nexus require-
ment that Ms. Alvarado needed to meet to qualify for asylum).
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a result, CAT relief is broader than that provided under the 1951
Convention and United States asylum law."'
2. Definition of Torture Narrows Scope of Relief
Second, CAT and United States asylum law are concerned with
different harms: torture and persecution, respectively.'" While Arti-
cle 1 of CAT defines the term "torture,""" the term "persecution,"
used in asylum law does not have a universally accepted definition.'"
Furthermore, Article 3 of CAT deals only with torture; it does not in-
clude other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment
within its scope." As a result, physical, emotional, and mental abuse
that might qualify as cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment does not satisfy Article 3 of CAT."' Additionally, Article 1
of CAT does not explicitly recognize non-state actors as agents of
108. See supra note 102 (providing the text of Article 33, paragraph I of the
1951 Convention, establishing who qualifies as a refugee, and the scope of the re-
lief provided under international refugee law and United States asylum law).
109. Compare Convention Against Torture, supra note 16, arts. 1, 3, 1465
U.N.T.S. at 113-14 (limiting the scope of the non-return principle of CAT as "tor-
ture" and not other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), with
1951 Convention, supra note 66, art. l(A)(2), 189 U.N.T.S., at 152 (correlating the
term "refugee" to the harm of persecution). See infra notes I 10- 111 and accompa-
nying text (highlighting the differences between the terms "torture" and "persecu-
tion").
110. See Article 1 Torture Definition, supra note 104 (providing verbatim text of
the definition of torture in Article 1, Paragraph I of CAT).
111. See UNHCR Handbook, supra note 96, para. 5 1. Paragraph 51 reads:
There is no universally accepted definition of "persecution," and various at-
tempts to formulate such a definition have met with liule success. From Arti-
cle 33 of the 1951 Convention, it may be inferred that a threat to life or free-
dom on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership
of a particular social group is always persecution. Other serious violations of
human rights-for the same reasons-would also constitute persecution.
Id.
112. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 16, art. 3, para. 1, 1465
U.N.T.S. at 114 (including only the term "torture" and not "other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment"). See generally ANKER, supra note 53, at 570-
71 (summarizing procedures for CAT relief prior to Mar. 22, 1999).
113. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 47, at 150 (noting that Article 3 of
CAT, unlike Articles 10-13, does not apply to cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment).
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torture,114 whereas the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees ("UNHCR") has recognized non-state actors as agents of perse-
cution under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention."' In these respects,
CAT relief is narrower than United States asylum law, which en-
compasses cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and recognizes
non-state actors as agents of persecution."'
a. Defining the "public official"
Part of the operative premise of the definition of torture in Article
1 of CAT is the identity of the offender. ' 7 Article 3 of CAT focuses
on torture where a public official bears some degree of responsibil-
ity. 8 Although CAT does not define the term "public official,""" the
United States did propose, in the deliberations of the Working
Group, that CAT should define the term "public official."'2 The
United States further proposed that CAT should provide that a public
official violates CAT: (1) when the public official is or should be
aware of the commission of torture, and (2) where the public official
114. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 16, art. 1, para. 1, 1465
U.N.T.S. at 113-14 (defining torture as "inflicted by or at the instigation of or with
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity").
115. See UNHCR Handbook, supra note 96, para. 65 (explaining that acts by
private actors qualify as persecution where the State is unable or unwilling to pro-
tect against the harm suffered).
116. See generally ANKER, supra note 53, at 469-70 (contrasting CAT relief
with United States asylum and withholding provisions); AHCENE BOULESBAA, THE
U.N. CONVENTION ON TORTURE AND THE PROSPECTS FOR ENFORCEMENT 9-35
(1999) (providing a commentary on Article l's scope of prohibited conduct, its op-
erative premise, and the over-breadth of its definition of torture).
117. See BOULESBAA, supra note 116, at 23-28 (1999) (analyzing the identity of
the offender component of Article 1 of CAT).
118. See Burgers & Danelius, supra note 47, at 1 (summarizing briefly the prin-
cipal aim of CAT).
119. See BOULESBAA, supra note 116, at 28 (noting that proposals to define the
term "public official" in Article 1 were not incorporated in CAT).
120. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 47, at 39-42 (discussing the 1979
Working Group meeting, during which the UN Secretary-General invited govern-
ments to comment on the Swedish draft of CAT). Specifically, the United States
proposed the following definition of the phrase "public official": "A public official
is any person vested with exercise of some official power of the state, either civil
of (sic) military." Id. at 42.
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is in a position to prevent the commission of such torture but does
not.12' Although the United States was unable to incorporate its
"public official" definition into the final version of CAT, it was able
to incorporate the phrase "or with the consent or acquiescence of'
into the final version.'" This phrase provides flexibility to the torture
definition by broadening the minimum level of public official in-
volvement that satisfies the torture definition.123
b. Interpreting "at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of. .."
While the State parties that drafted CAT considered and decided
against explicitly including private individuals as possible agents of
torture, 24 they did, nonetheless, recognize that the public officials'
responsibility extends beyond situations in which they directly cause
or instigate torture.' 2, Therefore, the State parties incorporated the
phrase "consent or acquiescence ' into the definition of torture,
121. See id. at 42 (providing the written comments of the United States on its
alternative proposal to the definition of torture in the Swedish draft text of CAT).
Specifically, the United States proposed that CAT include the following text, in
conjunction with the definition of "public official," as Article 2:
Any public official who (a) consents to an act of torture, (b) assists, incites,
solicits, commands, or conspires with others to commit torture, or (c) fails to
take appropriate measures to prevent or suppress torture when such person
has knowledge or should have knowledge that torture has or is being com-
mitted and has the authority or is in a position to take such measures, also
commits the offence of torture within the meaning of this Convention.
Id. at 42 (emphasis added).
122. Compare Article I Torture Definition, supra note 104 (providing the ver-
batim text of Article 1, Paragraph 1 of CAT), with BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra
note 47, at 41 (providing the text of the first draft of Article I of CAT, which only
included "by or at the instigation of').
123. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 47, at 45 (explaining how the
United States' recommendation to add the term "acquiescence" was accepted by
the States because they recognized that public officials who may not have com-
mitted the acts but bear some responsibility are also accountable).
124. See BOULESBAA, supra note 116, at 26 (noting that in CAT's travatLr pre-
paratoires the United States expressed its concern about the restrictiveness of "by
or at the instigation of" on its own).
125. See id. (noting that the United States felt the term "instigation" alone re-
stricted the application of the torture definition).
126. Convention Against Torture, supra note 16, art. 1, para. 1, 1465 U.N.T.S. at
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thereby recognizing a more expansive interpretation of the role of the
public official.1 2" By expanding the original draft of the torture defi-
nition to include "consent or acquiescence," the State parties who
drafted CAT recognized that public officials' omissions or failures to
act also constitute governmental involvement in torture. 2"
Moreover, an expansive interpretation must also recognize indi-
viduals with defacto enforcement power that a dejure government is
unable or unwilling to control, such as leaders of rebel groups. "" A
truly expansive interpretation will note that the term "acquiescence"
serves to capture the passive, yet potentially equally destructive, role
that a government can play.'30 This expansive interpretation is not
only consistent with the United States' role in drafting CAT, but also
with its obligations under Article 7 of the ICCPR."' Specifically, Ar-
ticle 7 of the ICCPR prohibits refoulement, irrespective of the iden-
tity of the agent of torture,'32 as a matter of customary international
113-14.
127. Cf UNHCR Handbook, supra note 96, para. 65 (explaining that certain ac-
tions of private actors can constitute persecution "if they are knowingly tolerated
by the authorities, or if the authorities refuse, or prove unable, to offer effective
protection").
128. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 16, art. 2, para. 1, 1465
U.N.T.S. at 114 (setting forth basic obligations of states to prevent torture). Article
2, Paragraph I of CAT reads: "Each State Party shall take effective legislative,
administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory
under its jurisdiction." Id.
129. See Karen Koning AbuZayd, Regional Representative, UNHCR Comments
on the Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture (Interim Rule)
(Apr. 20, 1999) 15 (recommending that the United States interpret "acquiescence
of a public official" to include groups with defacto enforcement power).
130. See Copelon, supra note 68, at 342 (arguing that state involvement in do-
mestic violence is both passive and active); see also Katherine M. Culliton, Find-
ing a Mechanism to Enforce Women's Right to State Protection from Domestic
Violence in the Americas, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 507, 522 (1993) (arguing that fail-
ure to prosecute domestic violence is an international human rights violation).
131. See ICCPR, supra note 40, art. 7, 999 U.N.T.S. at 171 ("No one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.").
132. See generally G.T. v. Australia, Communication No. 706/1996, para. 8.2
(1997) (explaining that a State violates the ICCPR when it deports a person who
faces a real risk that their rights under the ICCPR will be violated in the country to




3. Burden of P-oof
The final see-saw effect is the "substantial grounds" burden of
proof established under Article 3 of CAT.'4 The United States inter-
prets the phrase "substantial grounds" to mean "more likely than
not.' ' 35 The "more likely than not" burden of proof for withholding
of removal under CAT lacks the explicit subjective component that
United States asylum law includes in the "reasonable possibility of
persecution" burden of proof for a grant of asylum."' Similar to asy-
lum law, however, Article 3, Paragraph 2 of CAT specifically pro-
vides that objective evidence, such as annual country reports on hu-
man rights practices, are relevant to determining a withholding of
removal claim under CAT. '1 One explanation for this distinction is
that United States asylum law provides relief for victims of past per-
133. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES sec. 702(d) cmt. n (1992) (commenting that the prohibition against torture
is a matter of jus cogens, customary international law); see also MICHAEL
AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 25-34 (6th ed.
1991) (discussing custom as a source of international law). Customary interna-
tional law draws upon the behavior of states, both what they do and what they fail
to do, why they behave the way they do and how other states react. See id. at 29-
30.
134. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 16, art. 3, para. 1, 1465
U.N.T.S. at 114 (establishing the burden of proof necessary to demonstrate danger
of future torture).
135. See 136 CONG. REC. S17,486 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (recording the
United States' understanding that "substantial grounds" means "more likely than
not").
136. Compare David A. Martin, Office of the General Counsel, INS, Memoran-
dum on Compliance with Article 3 of CAT in the Cases of Removable Aliens,
May 14, 1997 (noting that the "more likely than not" standard under CAT is the
same as withholding of removal under INA section 241(b)(3)), with INS v. Car-
doza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439 (1987) (dismissing as erroneous the Immigration
Judge's application of INA section 241(b)(3) [formerly INA section 243(h)] "more
likely than not" standard of proof to Cardoza-Foneseca's INA section 208(a) asy-
lum claim and extending the Court's reasoning in INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 424-
25 (1984)).
137. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 16, art. 3, para. 2, 1465
U.N.T.S. at 114 (requiring that all relevant considerations be examined, including,
but not limited to, "the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of
gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights").
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secution as well as those with a well-founded fear of future persecut-
tion, and CAT only provides relief for the "more likely than not"
probability of future torture. 3 ' As a result, individuals who were tor-
tured before fleeing to the United States, but whose risk of future
torture does not satisfy the "more likely than not" burden of proof,
will not qualify for withholding of removal under CAT." 9 Therefore,
the scope of relief under Article 3 of CAT is narrower than under
United States asylum law. 140
III. INRE R-A-: A CASE STUDY
In re R-A- supports the argument that domestic violence victims
can qualify for withholding of removal under Article 3 of CAT. 4' By
analyzing the facts of Ms. Alvarado's case in a CAT context, the
nexus requirement issue, on which the BIA reversed her grant of
asylum, becomes moot.'4 2 Furthermore, Ms. Alvarado's horrific per-
sonal experiences are consistent with a comprehensive understanding
138. Compare 8 U.S.C.A. sec. I101(a)(42) (West 1999) (codifying "refugce" as
someone unable or unwilling to return to his or her country of nationality or last
habitual residence "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution")
and 8 C.F.R. sec. 208.13(b)(1) (1999) (providing regulations instructing the INS
that a person may qualify as a refugee "because he or she has suffered past perse-
cution or because he or she has a well-founded fear of future persecution"), with
Convention Against Torture, supra note 16, art. 3, para. 1, 1465 U.N.T.S. at 114
(using only the future conditional tense of "would be") and ANKER, supra note 53,
at 509 (explaining that Article 3 of CAT is designed only to prevent torture, not to
redress past instances of it).
139. See, e.g., Kristen B. Rosati, The United Nations Convention Against Tor-
ture: A Detailed Examination of the Convention Against Torture as an Alternative
for Asylum Seekers, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS (Dec. 1997), at 5 (noting that CAT relief
applies only to future torture).
140. See ANKER, supra note 53, at 509 (discussing the limited role of presump-
tive proof that past torture plays in CAT determination). The absolute bar against
removal under the non-refoulement principle enshrined in Article 3 of CAT, how-
ever, provides, in a different respect, broader relief. Compare ANKER, supra note
53, at 467-69 (discussing CAT's absolute bar to removal), with 8 U.S.C.A. sec.
1 158(b)(1) (West 1999) (providing that a grant of asylum is at the discretion of the
Attorney General, even if an individual establishes he or she suffered persecution
or has a well-founded fear of future persecution).
141. Interim Decision 3403, 1999 WL 424364, at *I (B.I.A. June I1, 1999).
142. See infra notes 153-154 and accompanying text (addressing the nexus is-
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of the definition of torture and satisfy the requirements of Article 1
of CAT. 143 Finally, and significantly for other domestic violence vic-
tims pursuing CAT relief, Ms. Alvarado's case reveals the types of
evidence that domestic violence victims can use to meet CAT's bur-
den of proof.'"
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In May 1995, Ms. Alvarado fled Guatemala, where she suffered
more than ten years of extreme physical, emotional, and sexual abuse
at the hands of her husband. 45 On September 20, 1996, an immigra-
tion judge granted Ms. Alvarado asylum, based on past abuse suf-
fered and a well-founded fear of future persecution."' The INS sub-
sequently appealed the decision to the BIA."' On appeal, the INS
argued that the defined social group 14 was not a particular social
group, that Ms. Alvarado was not persecuted because of her mem-
bership in this group, and that Ms. Alvarado's husband was not mo-
tivated to persecute her on account of his belief that her resistance
constituted a political opinion.''9 The BIA split ten to five in favor of
143. See infra notes 159-219 and accompanying text (discussing how Ms. Al-
varado qualifies for CAT relief).
144. See ihfi-a notes 204-219 and accompanying text (discussing CAT burden of
proof requirements and how domestic violence victims, such as Ms. Alvarado, can
satisfy these requirements).
145. See In re R-A-, 1999 WL 424364, at *24 (detailing the abuse suffered).
Ms. Alvarado was beaten severely, raped, whipped, pistol-whipped, and threatened
with dismemberment and death continuously over a period of ten years. See id.;
see also Karen Musalo, Matter of R-A-: An Analysis of the Decision and Its lmph-
cations, 76 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1177 (Aug. 9, 1999) (providing a brief synop-
sis of facts by co-counsel on appeal to Ninth Circuit).
146. See In re R-A-, 1999 WL 424364, at *5 (summarizing the Immigration
Judge's decision). The Immigration Judge found that "Guatemalan women who
have been intimately involved with Guatemalan male companions, who believe
that women are to live under male domination" constituted a particular social
group of which Ms. Alvarado was a member. See id. The Immigration Judge also
accepted Ms. Alvarado's argument of imputed political opinion. See id. at *2.
147. See id. at *2 (noting that INS appealed grant of asylum to Ms. Alvarado in
a timely fashion).
148. See supra note 146 (discussing the definition of a particular social group
accepted by the Immigration Judge in hi re R-A-).
149. See In re R-A-, 1999 WL 424364, at *5-6 (outlining the government's ar-
guments on appeal).
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sustaining the INS' appeal. "' The BIA dissent maintained that the
failure to recognize that Ms. Alvarado was a member of a particular
social group contravenes BIA and United States federal courts'
precedent, the United States Department of Justice's Gender Guide-
lines, and international human rights development."5' On September
2, 1999, Ms. Alvarado's attorneys filed a motion to reopen her case
before the BIA to seek CAT relief.'52
B. ANALYZING CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE RELIEF FOR
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS
One advantage CAT relief has over asylum is that it does not in-
clude a nexus requirement,'5 a major hurdle domestic violence vic-
tims face when seeking asylum.'54 Although the scope of the Article
150. See id. at *2 (listing ten Board members in the majority and five Board
members in the dissent). In deciding whether Ms. Alvarado's persecution was on
account of her membership in a particular social group, the BIA majority rejected
the social group: "Guatemalan women who have been intimately involved with
Guatemalan male companions, who believe that women are to live under male
domination." Id. at * 13.
151. See id. at *21-22 (providing an overview of the dissent's arguments in fa-
vor of upholding Ms. Alvarado's grant of asylum).
152. See CAT Support Memorandum, supra note 63, at 17 (requesting a stay of
deportation until the BIA decides the CAT claim).
153. See discussion supra Part II.B. I (arguing that the absence of a nexus re-
quirement broadens the scope of relief available under CAT).
154. See In re R-A-, 1999 WL 424364, at *5, 12-16 (articulating three reasons
as to why the social group, as defined, does not constitute a particular social
group). First, Ms. Alvarado did not demonstrate that the social group was recog-
nizable as a segment of Guatemalan society. See id. at * 12. Second, Ms. Alvarado
did not show that other spousal abuse victims saw themselves as part of this group
and that their persecutors also saw them as part of the defined social group. See id.
Third, Ms. Alvarado failed to establish that spousal abuse is an important charac-
teristic within Guatemalan society. See id. Significantly, the BIA majority argued
in the alternative that, even if it accepted the defined social group, Ms. Alvarado
did not prove that her husband persecuted her on account of her membership in this
social group. See id. at *13. In doing so, it articulated the following reasons: First,
Ms. Alvarado's husband persecuted her because she was his wife and not because
she was a member of a particular social group. See id. at * 14. Second, the record of
the case did not show that the Guatemalan government encouraged spousal abuse.
See In re R-A-, 1999 WL 424364, at *14-15. Finally, the BIA cannot construe pri-
vate acts of violence, such as spousal abuse, as government persecution without
hindering Congressional intent in codifying the asylum statute. See id. at * 16; see
also Patricia Seith, Note, Escaping Domestic Violence: Asylum as a Means of
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1 torture definition in CAT and the higher "more likely than not"
burden of proof established under Article 3 are challenging to sat-
isfy,' they do not preclude domestic violence victims from success-
fully qualifying for CAT relief.'5 6 Specifically, this section will ana-
lyze CAT's Article 1 torture definition and burden of proof
requirement to demonstrate how domestic violence victims, such as
Ms. Alvarado, may successfully qualify for CAT relief.'"
1. Establishing that Domestic Violence Meets the Definition of
Torture
There are three main elements of the definition of torture that are
relevant to immigrant domestic violence victims: (1) severe physical
or mental pain or suffering; (2) intentional infliction for purposes
enumerated and unenumerated; and (3) involvement of a public offi-
cial.58
a. Severe Physical or Mental Pain or Suffering
The first element, requiring individuals to suffer severe physical or
mental pain, is not difficult for egregiously abused domestic violence
victims to establish.'" Ms. Alvarado, for example, suffered numerous
Protection for Battered Women, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1804, 1838 (1997) (explain-
ing that the floodgates argument is a possible explanation for the difficulties do-
mestic violence victims face in establishing persecution on account of membership
in a particular social group). For case law that deals generally with membership in
a particular social group, see Matter of Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A.
Mar. 1, 1985) (construing "membership in a particular social group" to mean all
members of the group share a common, immutable characteristic).
155. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 16, arts. 1, 3, 1465 U.N.T.S. at
113-14 (establishing the torture definition and the burden of proof for CAT relief,
respectively); 136 CONG. REC. S17,486 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (providing United
States' understanding that "substantial grounds" in Article 3 of CAT means "more
likely than not").
156. See hifra notes 159-219 and accompanying text (analyzing how domestic
violence victims, such as Ms. Alvarado, can qualify for CAT relief).
157. See generally ANKER, supra note 53, at 485 (outlining the main elements of
Article 1, Paragraph 1 of CAT).
158. See infra notes 159-219 and accompanying text (discussing in detail the
outlined areas).
159. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 47, at 117 (stating that beating,
kicking, and similar acts meet the physical pain prong in the Article 1 torture defi-
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instances of rape, sodomy, beatings that involved hitting, kicking,
hair pulling, pistol-whipping, and whipping with electrical cords."W
Moreover, international jurisprudence recognizes the acts suffered by
Ms. Alvarado as severe physical pain.'6 For example, the Committee
Against Torture"62 recognizes that rape and beatings with and without
the use of additional instruments, such as whips, fulfill this element
of the definition of torture.'63
Additionally, mental pain and suffering is a significant component
of the egregious abuse domestic violence victims suffer.'6" Subject to
the United States Senate's understanding of Article 1 of CAT,'65 the
United States requires that to qualify as torture, mental pain or suf-
fering must satisfy at least one of four criteria. 1 66 In practice, two of
nition in CAT).
160. See In re R-A-, 1999 WL 424364, at *2-4 (providing testimony and state-
ment of abuse of R-A-). The BIA found Ms. Alvarado's testimony credible. See id.
at *8.
161. See infra note 163 (providing a Committee Against Torture case).
162. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 16, art. 17, para. 1, 1465
U.N.T.S. at 116 (establishing the Committee Against Torture). Articles 17-24 of
CAT describe the composition and functions of the Committee. See id. at 116-21.
Unless the State Party explicitly recognizes the competence of the Committee, the
Committee cannot receive communications from or on behalf of individuals within
that State. See id. art. 22(1), (2), at 120.
163. See Report of the Committee Against Torture, Annex V, Comm. No.
41/1996, para. 2.1-2.6, 9.6 (visited Mar. 10, 2000) <http://www.unhchr.ch/
tbs/doc.nsf/MasterFrameView/33df74db40ae264880256473004fedf2?Opendocum
ent> (finding that a Zairian woman who was regularly raped and beaten in Zaire
qualified for relief under Article 3 of CAT); see also 1997 Report of the Special
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, supra note 62, para. 67 (commenting
that rape is increasingly recognized as torture).
164. See MARGI LAIRD MCCUE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A REFERENCE
HANDBOOK 78-83 (1995) (finding that domestic violence is not limited to physical
abuse, but includes emotional and sexual abuse as well); R. EMERSON DOBASH &
RUSSELL DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES: A CASE AGAINST THE PATRIARCHY
111 (1979) (maintaining that physical abuse causes severe emotional distress).
165. See 136 CONG. REC. S17,491-92 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (attaching an un-
derstanding concerning the definition of torture in Article 1, Paragraph I to the
United States Senate's advice and consent on the ratification of CAT).
166. See 8 C.F.R. sec. 208.18(a)(4)(i)-(iv) (1999) (setting forth four criteria for
mental pain or suffering). The four criteria are:




the four criteria---"intentional infliction or threatened infliction of
severe physical pain or suffering" and "[t]he threat of imminent
death"--are particularly tangible for domestic violence victims."
The physical pain and suffering that Ms. Alvarado suffered at the
hands of her husband is well-documented.'" Furthermore, in addition
to Ms. Alvarado's husband's most recent threat to "hunt her down
and kill her if she comes back to Guatemala,"''' Ms. Alvarado's hus-
band threatened her with death repeatedly over a period of ten years,
which satisfies the requirement of prolonged mental harm.'"
b. Intentional Infliction and the Purpose Thereof
The second element, that the severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person and the pur-
poses for which it is inflicted, is challenging for domestic violence
victims to establish, but not insurmountable." The term "intention-
ally inflicted" is included in the definition of torture to ensure that
accidental or negligent acts are not included within the scope of tor-
ture.'72 In its understanding of Article 1, the United States interpreted
(ii) The administration or application, or threatened administration or appli-
cation, of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt
profoundly the senses or the personality;
(iii) The threat of imminent death; or
(iv) The threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, se-
vere physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind
altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the
sense or personality.
Id.
167. See id. at (i), (iii) (enumerating the criteria to establish torture).
168. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (discussing the severe physical
pain Ms. Alvarado's husband inflicted on her).
169. In re R-A-, 1999 WL 424364, at *4.
170. See In the Matter of Alvarado-Pefia, A73-753-922 (establishing that Ms.
Alvarado married her husband in 1984 and the abuse began shortly thereafter and
continued until she fled Guatemala in 1995).
171. See inf!ra notes 173-178 (discussing the reasons why the intentional inflic-
tion and the purpose thereof element may be more difficult for domestic violence
victims to establish than the physical pain and suffering element).
172. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 47, at 118 (maintaining that the
term "intentionally" excludes pain or suffering accidentally or negligently in-
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the term "intentionally" to mean "specifically intended.""' This lim-
its the scope of the severe physical or mental pain or suffering that
may constitute torture.' 71 It should not, however, require domestic
violence victims, such as Ms. Alvarado, to prove that there was a
specific intent or reason on the part of their abusers to harm them."'
In the domestic violence context, Ms. Alvarado's husband told her
that he could abuse her if he wanted to do So.176 The logical implica-
tion is that Ms. Alvarado's husband did not accidentally or negli-
gently harm her, but rather did so deliberately and maliciously.
'7
1
Furthermore, domestic violence victims, such as Ms. Alvarado, fit
within the enumerated Article 1 purposes of punishment, intimida-
tion, coercion, and discrimination of any kind; 7 1 that is, domestic
violence is widely recognized as a situation in which the man seeks
to dominate and control the woman.179
flicted); see also BOULESBAA, supra note 116, at 20 (proposing that the United
States should substitute "intentional" with "deliberately and maliciously" as a bet-
ter reflection of its understanding of Article 1).
173. See 136 CONG. REC. S17,491-92 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (setting forth
United States reservations, declarations, and understandings to CAT for ratifica-
tion).
174. See BOULESBAA, supra note 116, at 20-21 (noting that the United States
legal system defines intent as both specific and general, but its understanding of
Article I reflects only specific intent).
175. See In re R-A-, 1999 WL 424364, at *19-20 (concluding that Ms. Al-
varado's husband's motivation to beat her varied but was not on account of her
membership in a particular social group).
176. See id. at *3 (establishing as part of the factual record that Ms. Alvarado
testified that her husband told her "I can do it if I want to.").
177. See generally BOULESBAA supra note 116, at 20 (arguing that "deliberately
and maliciously" is a better interpretation of the United States' understanding of
the term "intentional").
178. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 16, art. 1, para. 1, 1465
U.N.T.S. at 113-14 (listing the purposes mentioned in Part III.B.1.b of this Com-
ment).
179. See Seith, supra note 154, at 1807-09 (explaining the nature of domestic
violence). See generally Kristin L. Taylor, Note, Treating Male Violence Against




c. Involvement of a Public Official
The third element, the involvement of a public official in the se-
vere physical or mental pain that is intentionally inflicted on a per-
son, is most susceptible to legal interpretation difficulties for domes-
tic violence victims. 80
Domestic violence victims encounter two interrelated, but not in-
surmountable, difficulties with this third element.'"' First, subject to
the United States Senate's understanding of Article 1 of CAT,"2 the
United States, interprets an act of torture as one that "must be di-
rected against a person in the offender's custody or physical con-
trol."'83 The INS 'm interprets the terms "custody" and "physical con-
trol" to mean detention or imprisonment, and command of the body,
respectively.'85 These terms, however, are not defined specifically in
the regulations implementing CAT.8 6 Therefore, it is possible to ex-
180. See, e.g., Service's Opposition to Respondent's Motion to "Reopen and
Remand" at 1, hI re R-A-, Interim Decision 3403, 1999 WL 424364, at *4-5
(B.I.A. June 11, 1999) (File No. A73-753-922) [hereinafter Service's Opposition]
(arguing that the Guatemalan government had no prior knowledge of the abuse of
which Ms. Alvarado complained and that she was not in her husband's custody or
physical control). But see Shamita Das Dasgupta, Women 's Realities: Defining
Violence Against Women b, Immigration, Race, and Class, in ISSUES IN INTIMATE
VIOLENCE 211 (Raquel Kennedy Bergen ed., 1998) (noting that the individual of-
fender and the victim are not isolated from but "nested within the supportive cir-
cles of social institutions and culture").
181. See infra notes 182-203 and accompanying text (discussing how domestic
violence victims can overcome difficulties with public officials).
182. See 136 CONG. REC. S17,491-92 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (attaching an un-
derstanding concerning the definition of torture in Article 1, to the United States
Senate's advice and consent on the ratification of CAT).
183. 8 C.F.R. sec. 208.18(a)(6) (1999).
184. See Service's Opposition, supra note 180, at 1 (listing the names and posi-
tions of INS employees involved most directly in In re R-A-). These persons are
Ronald E. Lefevre, District Counsel, William C. Peterson, Deputy District Coun-
sel, and Amy T. Lee, Assistant District Counsel. See id. For the purposes of this
part of the Comment, INS will serve as the collective term for these three individu-
als.
185. See id. at 6-7 (citing WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE
AMERICAN LANGUAGE (College ed. 1960)) (discussing how Ms. Alvarado failed to
meet custody or physical control requirement of the definition of torture codified at
8 C.F.R. section 208.18(a)).
186. See 8 C.F.R. sec. 208.18(a)(6) (1999) ("In order to constitute torture an act
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amine other interpretations of these terms.'87 For example, the term
"custody" also means mere physical power of imprisoning, and
"physical control" also means dominating or overpowering the
body.'88 Furthermore, the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
Women recently recommended that "custody" includes "psychologi-
cal custody," thus recognizing that flashbacks and fear continue even
after the physical suffering ends.89
Because the regulation reads "custody or physical control," do-
mestic violence victims pursuing a claim under CAT can demon-
strate either. '90 In In re R-A-, Ms. Alvarado testified that her husband
routinely walked her to and from work,'9' and whenever she tried to
escape, he always found her, sometimes beating her unconscious. '
At one point, Ms. Alvarado's husband threatened to cut off her arms
and legs with a machete to prevent her from ever trying to escape
must be directed against a person in the offender's custody or physical control.").
187. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 329, 384 (6th ed. 1990) (explaining
that the term "control" means, inter alia, to "dominate" and to "overpower" and
the term custody "is very elastic and may mean actual imprisonment or physical
detention or mere power, legal or physical, of imprisoning..."). The term "physi-
cal" is satisfactorily defined by the INS. See supra note 185 and accompanying
text (defining "physical" as "of the body").
188. Cf BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 187 (presenting alternative
definitions to those used by the INS).
189. See 1997 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women,
supra note 62, pt. II, para. B (discussing forms of custody other than police cus-
tody).
190. See infra notes 191-192 (discussing how Ms. Alvarado satisfies the custody
or physical control requirement).
191. See In re R-A-, 1999 WL 424364, at *2 (discussing one example of the
physical control Ms. Alvarado's husband had over her).
192. See id. at *3 (providing another example of the physical control Ms. Al-
varado's husband had over her); see also Petitioner's Reply Memorandum in Sup-
port of Motion to Reopen and Remand Pursuant to the Convention Against Torture
at 6-7, In re R-A-, Interim Decision 3403, 1999 WL 424364, at *1 (B.I.A. June 11,
1999) (File No. A73-53-922) (on file with author) [hereinafter Petitioner's Reply
Memorandum] (arguing that the examples provided in Ms. Alvarado's testimony
meet the INS definition of being "physically controlled" by her husband); Pamela
Goldberg, Anyplace But Home: Asylum in the United States for Women Fleeing
Intimate Violence, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 565, 566-67 (1993) (recounting a
woman's story describing on-going physical control even after she no longer lived
with her abuser).
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again.' 93 This is an example that demonstrates physical control.
Second, subject to the United States Senate's understanding of
Article 1 of CAT,'9 the United States interprets the term "acquies-
cence" to require the satisfaction of two criteria.'" First, the public
official must have an awareness of the torture prior to the fact, and
second, the public official, having such awareness, must "thereafter
breach his or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such ac-
tivity.
' '196
The INS construes the first criterion to mean that, where fulfilled,
the public official had prior knowledge that the torture would oc-
cur.' 97 However, in the Senate Foreign Relation Committee's report,
recommending ratification of CAT, the Committee explained that
actual knowledge as well as "willful blindness" satisfy the awareness
requirement." In In re R-A-, Ms. Alvarado testified that she ap-
193. See In re R-A-, 1999 WL 424364, at *3 (providing yet another example of
the physical control Ms. Alvarado's husband exerted over her); see also Peti-
tioner's Reply Memorandum, supra note 192, at 6-7 (arguing that the facts pre-
sented by Ms. Alvarado prove not only the physical control, but also the psycho-
logical control, Ms. Alvarado's husband exercised over her); Copelon, supra note
68, at 344-48 (analyzing the element of custody in the torture definition and con-
eluding that domestic violence victims meet it).
194. See 136 CONG. REc. S17,491-92 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (attaching an un-
derstanding concerning the definition of torture in Article 1 to the Senate's advice
and consent on the ratification of CAT).
195. See 8 C.F.R. see. 208.18(7) (1999) ("Acquiescence of a public official re-
quires that the public official, prior to the activity constituting torture, have aware-
ness of such activity and thereafter breach his or her legal responsibility to inter-
vene to prevent such activity.").
196. Id.
197. See Service's Opposition, supra note 180, at 4-5 (arguing that public offi-
cials in Guatemala did not acquiesce to Ms. Alvarado's abuse) (on file with
author); see also Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women: Framework for
Model Legislation on Domestic Violence, supra note 61, para. 14 (recommending
that legislation include that police officers must treat domestic violence as seri-
ously as other crimes).
198. See S. EXEC. REP. 101-30, at 9 (1990) ("The purpose of this condition is to
make it clear that both actual knowledge and 'willful blindness' fall within the
definition of the term 'acquiescence' in [the article]."); see also Special Rappor-
teur on Violence Against Women: Framework for Model Legislation on Domestic
Violence, supra note 61, paras. 26-43 (setting forth the duties of judicial officers
and recommending that countries should include those duties in their domestic
violence legislation). These duties include issuing ex parte temporary restraining
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proached the Guatemalan police and judiciary for protection, but re-
ceived no assistance.'" Specifically, the Guatemalan police issued
summonses requiring Ms. Alvarado's husband to appear before
them, however, when he did not, the Guatemalan police made no ef-
fort to pursue him.200 Furthermore, when Ms. Alvarado approached a
Guatemalan judge, the judge characterized Ms. Alvarado's severe
physical and mental pain and suffering as a domestic dispute and re-
fused to interfere.20 ' Therefore, even if public officials in Guatemala
did not know of Ms. Alvarado's torture before she reported it,02 from
such point forward, they possessed actual knowledge of its unabated
continuance and were willfully blind.0 3
2. Meeting the Burden of Proof
The Article 1 torture definition in CAT20 directly bears on whether
or not an individual, specifically a domestic violence victim, will
orders and protection orders. See id. paras. 26-32. Ex parte temporary restraining
orders may require the offender to leave the family home, restrain the offender
from stalking or harassing the victim, and require that the offender pay the victim's
medical bills. See id. para. 29(i), (iii)-(iv). These orders may also inform victims of
their rights to prosecute their offenders and sue in a civil court for divorce or sepa-
ration, as well as damages and compensation. See id. para. 29(vii)-(viii). Protection
orders are a permanent form of relief, which here set forth similar requirements to
the exparte temporary restraining orders. See id. paras. 33-43.
199. See In re R-A-, 1999 WL 424364, at *4 (establishing that public officials in
Guatemala were aware of the abuse suffered by Ms. Alvarado).
200. See id. (providing an example of the actual knowledge of public officials of
the torture suffered by Ms. Alvarado).
201. See id. (providing an example of the willful blindness of a Guatemalan
public official to the torture suffered by Ms. Alvarado).
202. See Service's Opposition, supra note 180, at 4-5 (arguing that CAT regula-
tions require a public official to have prior knowledge of the specific act of torture
before it occurred) (on file with author). But see Petitioner's Reply Memorandum,
supra note 192, at 4-5 (arguing that CAT does not require that public officials have
knowledge of the specific acts of torture before they happen) (on file with author).
203. See generally ANKER, supra note 53, at 500-01 (providing additional analy-
sis on the United States understanding of acquiescence as actual knowledge or
willful blindness).
204. See supra notes 109-133 and accompanying text (analyzing how the defi-
nition of torture narrows the scope of relief available) and notes 143-147 and ac-
companying text (demonstrating how domestic violence victims satisfy the ele-
ments of the torture definition).
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meet the burden of proof to qualify for withholding of removal under
Article 3 of CAT.205 In evaluating whether domestic violence victims
meet the burden of proof,2 immigration judges and the BIA' " should
consider evidence of past torture,20 the availability of an internal
flight altemative,2 the existence of country-wide human rights
abuses,2 10 and other relevant country conditions information.2" The
successful applicant must prove that "it is more likely than not that
he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of
removal. ,21 2
In In re R-A-, Ms. Alvarado suffered severe physical and mental
pain and suffering,213 intentionally inflicted by her husband in order
to punish, intimidate, and coerce her.1 ' Guatemalan public officials
willfully ignored these acts of violence."5 Furthermore, Ms. Alvarado
205. See 8 C.F.R. sec. 208.16(c)(2) (1999) (establishing that the burden of proof
is on the applicant).
206. See 8 C.F.R. sec. 208.16(c)(3) (1999) (providing an illustrative, but not ex-
haustive, list of evidence and information to consider when assessing a CAT
claim).
207. See INS Supplemental Instructions, supra note 27 (explaining that only
immigration judges and the BIA rule on CAT claims).
208. See 8 C.F.R. sec. 208.16(c)(3)(i) (1999) (including evidence of past torture
suffered by the applicant as a tool for evaluating CAT claim).
209. See 8 C.F.Rt sec. 208.16(c)(3)(ii) (1999) ("Evidence that the applicant
could relocate to a part of the country of removal where he or she is not likely to be
tortured"). But cf Donkoh, supra note 62, at 7-8 (dispelling the mistaken belief
that an internal flight alternative is more feasible for domestic violence victims);
UNHCR Handbook, supra note 96, para. 91 (explaining that failure to seek refuge
elsewhere in the flight country does not exclude a person from refugee status).
210. See 8 C.F.R sec. 208.16(c)(3)(iii) (1999) ("Evidence of gross, flagrant or
mass violations of human rights within the country of removal, where applica-
ble.").
211. See 8 C.F.R. sec. 208.16(c)(3)(iv) (1999) (providing a broad fourth cate-
gory of suggested relevant evidence for determining a CAT claim).
212. 8 C.F.R. sec. 208.16(c)(2) (1999).
213. See supra Part III.B.l.a (analyzing how Ms. Alvarado satisfies the first
element of the torture definition).
214. See supra Part III.B.l.b (describing how Ms. Alvarado satisfies the second
element of the torture definition).
215. See supra Part III.B.l.c (analyzing how Ms. Alvarado satisfied the third
element of the torture definition).
2000]
AM. U. INT'L L. REv8.
presented evidence that her husband will "hunt her down and kill her
if she comes back to Guatemala. ' '2t6 This evidence demonstrates that
there is nowhere in Guatemala where Ms. Alvarado can live safely.
2, 7
In addition, through the testimony of an expert witness, Ms. Al-
varado established that domestic violence is a serious problem in
Latin America, particularly Guatemala.2 8 Social and legal resources
are inaccessible to domestic violence victims in Guatemala, and pur-
suing legal relief is often ineffective.2 9 For all of the foregoing rea-
sons, Ms. Alvarado qualifies for withholding of removal under CAT.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Although asylum is the preferred legal remedy for persons immi-
grating to the United States,2 CAT is an important and viable alter-
native legal remedy for domestic violence victims. 2' Withholding of
removal under CAT is an additional means through which to ensure
that the United States will not extradite, expel, or return a domestic
violence victim to a country where she will probably be tortured.
22
Since the INS regulations, which apply the implementing legislation,
216. In re R-A-, Interim Decision 3403, 1999 WL 424364, at *4 (B.I.A. June 11,
1999).
217. See 8 C.F.R. sec. 208.16(c)(3)(ii) (1999) (establishing that evidence con-
cerning an internal flight alternative is relevant to assessing CAT claim); CAT
Support Memorandum, supra note 63, at 15 (arguing that Ms. Alvarado cannot es-
cape her husband's torture by relocating within Guatemala).
218. See In re R-A-, 1999 WL 424364, at *4 (noting testimony of expert witness
on this point).
219. See id. at *4-5 (summarizing the testimony of the witness, Dr. Doris
Bersing); see also CAT Support Memorandum, supra note 63, at 15 (indicating
that the BIA found Dr. Bersing's testimony credible).
220. See discussion supra Part II.A and accompanying notes (discussing the rea-
sons why asylum is always the preferred form of relief).
221. See, e.g., Rosati, supra note 139, at 3-4 (confirming that Article 3 of CAT
is a "powerful tool" because it is mandatory and not discretionary relief).
222. See DAN KESSELBRENNER & LORY D. ROSENBERG, IMMIGRATION LAW
AND CRIMES sec. 9.3(c) (Norton Tooby, updating ed., Release # 26, July 1999)
(explaining that prior to the Mar. 22, 1999 INS Regulations implementing CAT,
the BIA lacked jurisdiction over CAT claims). See generally In re H-M-V-, In-
terim Decision 3365, 1998 WL 611753 *1, *2-4 (B.I.A. Aug. 25, 1998) (denying
an Iranian asylum seeker's motion to reopen his case to evaluate a CAT claim be-
cause, at the time, no regulations implementing Article 3 of CAT existed).
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are largely untested thus far, it is too soon to tell how effective the
new procedures for adjudicating CAT claims will be.'" For domestic
violence victims, there are legitimate concerns that CAT relief is not
a completely satisfactory safety net, but these concerns are not in-
surmountable.' In the aftermath of In r-e R-A-, it is even more im-
portant to address these concerns in a timely and efficient 
manner.
A. ESTABLISHING A MORE FAVORABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW
First, the INS should amend 8 C.F.R. sec. 208.16(c)(3) -' to in-
clude the following provisions: (1) the INS and United States federal
and immigration courts should give the individual seeking alternative
relief under CAT the benefit of the doubt in establishing his or her
claim; (2) it is frequently difficult to obtain relevant documentary
evidence corroborating a claim; and (3) the absence of relevant
documentary evidence that corroborates a claim should not prejudice
the claim.227 These amendments are particularly important for do-
223. See Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg.
8478, 8478 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 8 C.F.R.) (indicating that these
regulations took effect on Mar. 22, 1999). At the time of this writing, February
2000, therefore, the Regulations were approximately one year old.
224. See discussion supra Parts II.B, III.B and accompanying notes (evaluating
the benefits and drawbacks of CAT relief in the context of domestic violence vic-
tims).
225. See In re R-A-, 1999 WL 424364, at *20 (holding that United States asy-
lum law, as currently formulated, does not provide protection for domestic vio-
lence victims, such as Ms. Alvarado). This is particularly troublesome because the
BIA's decision in this case is binding precedent for asylum officers and immigra-
tion judges unless the Attorney General certifies the case and overturns it, or the
Ninth Circuit reverses it on appeal. See Public Affairs Staff, supra note I (on file
with author) (discussing the structure of the BIA, its jurisdiction, and where its de-
cisions are subject to appellate review); see also Rosati, supra note 139, at 1
(commenting that while the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsi-
bility Act of 1996 has foreclosed avenues of relief for asylum-seekers, CAT claims
may be a viable alternative form of relief).
226. See Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg.
8478 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 8 C.F.R.) (establishing procedures to
ensure compliance with article 3 of CAT (non-refoulement)).
227. See 8 C.F.R. sec. 208.16(c)(2), (3) (1999) (indicating that credible testi-
mony of the applicant "may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof without
corroboration" and establishing four categories of evidence that are illustrative, but
not exhaustive) (emphasis added). The four illustrative categories of relevant evi-
dence are:
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mestic violence victims because of the inherently private nature of
the abuse suffered.228
B. BROADENING THE BASE OF SUPPORT FOR CAT CLAIMS
Second, the INS, in keeping with United States' international obli-
gations under CAT, should amend 8 C.F.R. sec. 208.18(a) to include
the language of Article 1(2) of CAT. 229 Article 1(2) of CAT provides
that the Article 1 torture definition in CAT "is without prejudice to
any international instrument or national legislation which does or
may contain provisions of wider application.""23 Article 1(2) of CAT
suggests that immigration advocates can rely on relevant provisions
within other international treaties to support claims for withholding
of removal under Article 3 of CAT."' By providing a broader base of
instruments from which to draw support, domestic violence victims
who seek alternative relief under Article 3 of CAT are better posi-
tioned to prove their claims.232 For domestic violence victims who do
not qualify for a grant of asylum or withholding of removal under
NA section 241(b)(3), such a provision in the INS regulations im-
(i) Evidence of past torture inflicted upon the applicant;
(ii) Evidence that the applicant could relocate to a part of the country of re-
moval where he or she is not likely to be tortured;
(iii) Evidence of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights within the
country of removal, where applicable; and
(iv) Other relevant information regarding conditions in the country of re-
moval.
Id. sec. 208.16(c)(3).
228. Cf Emily Love, Equality in Political Asylum Law: For a Legislative Rec-
ognition of Gender-Based Persecution, 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 133, 141-45
(1994) (discussing the intersection of private abuse and political persecution that
judges are missing).
229. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 16, art. 1, para. 2, 1465
U.N.T.S. at 114 (defining the procedural parameters of the definition of torture in
Article 1, Paragraph 1).
230. Id.
231. See Dutton, supra note 46 (discussing how European law can assist Ameri-
can immigration lawyers).
232. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text (discussing other interna-
tional instruments, some of which are customary international law, which are rele-
vant to domestic violence victims).
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plementing CAT could help to resolve the tension between narrow-
ing and broadening CAT relief in their favor.2"
C. INTERPRETING "TORTURE" EXPANSIVELY
Third, the INS should amend 8 C.F.R. sec. 208.18(a) to expand the
term "acquiescence" to recognize that public officials can play a pas-
sive rather than active role in torture. The term "acquiescence" in the
Article 1 torture definition allows United States federal and immi-
gration courts to interpret the CAT torture definition expansively and
recognize that egregious domestic violence can qualify as a form of
torture.23 Furthermore, an expansive interpretation of Article 1 does
not violate the United States' obligations under CAT, as would a nar-
rower interpretation. " Moreover, an expansive interpretation of Ar-
ticle 1 need not contravene the reservations, declarations, and under-
standings that the United States Senate submitted before advising the
United States to ratify CAT.236 The incorporation of the phrase "or
with the consent or acquiescence of" into the final definition of tor-
ture in Article 1 provides support for a more expansive interpretation
of the role of the public official in the torture suffered by domestic
violence victims.2
7
233. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text (discussing international
human rights instruments, other than CAT, and implementing bodies that form part
of the customary international norm of prohibiting torture); see also supra notes
72-74 and accompanying text (providing a more detailed discussion of the ICCPR
and the UDHR).
234. See supra notes 124-133 and accompanying text (supporting the position
that the terms "public official" and "at the instigation of or with the consent or ac-
quiescence of' have an expansive capacity).
235. See Copelon, supra note 68, at 355-56 (arguing that "'acquiescence" in Ar-
ticle 1 of CAT is a broad enough term to include domestic violence victims); see
also supra notes 159-219 (analyzing how a domestic violence victim denied asy-
lum qualifies for withholding of removal under Article 3 of CAT).
236. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 16, art. 1, pam. 2, 1465
U.N.T.S. at 114 (establishing that the torture definition in Article 1, Paragraph I
does not close the door on other torture definitions with wider applications than the
instant one).
237. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW\' OF THE
UNITED STATES sec. 702(d) cmt. n (1992) (commenting on the prohibition against
torture).
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D. ADDRESSING THE NEEDS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS
Finally, the United States Congress should legislate an INA provi-
sion, similar to the special rule for battered spouses and children Lin-
der INA section 240A, that would allow domestic violence victims
who received grants of withholding of removal under Article 3 of
CAT to adjust to legal permanent resident status.23 Currently, INA
section 240A codifies cancellation of removal provisions and ad-
justment of status for certain nonpermanent residents, and section
240A(b)(2) includes a special rule for battered spouses and chil-
239dren. In the context of domestic violence victims suffering egre-
gious abuse, this special rule for battered spouses only applies to
women who have a United States citizen or legal permanent resident
spouse who subjected them to extreme cruelty.141 In addition, the
domestic violence victim must have resided continuously in the
United States for at least three years immediately preceding the filing
date of an application to adjust status. 4' Furthermore, the domestic
violence victim must prove herself to be "a person of good moral
character during such period.,
242
The current INA section 240A(b)(2) provision demonstrates that
the United States Congress recognizes domestic violence in instances
where the immigrant domestic violence victim was abused in the
United States. In cases where domestic violence victims have re-
ceived withholding of removal under Article 3 of CAT, the fact that
the abusive spouse is outside of the United States should not pre-
clude her from adjusting to legal permanent resident status. Further-
more, domestic violence victims who receive withholding of removal
238. See 8 U.S.C.A. sec. 1229 (West 1999) (codifying section 240A(b)(2) (pro-
viding cancellation of removal and adjustment of status for certain nonpermanent
residents); see also In re R-A-, 1999 WL 424364, at *20 (noting that the issue of
amending asylum law to provide more protection for domestic violence victims is
a matter for Congress to consider).
239. See 8 U.S.C.A. sec. 1229(b)(2) (West 1999) (codifying special rule for
battered spouse or child).
240. See id. sec. 1229(b)(2)(A) (setting forth one criterion for canceling removal
and adjusting status of battered spouses who are inadmissible or deportable).
241. See id. sec. 1229(b)(2)(B) (establishing a physical presence criterion that
battered spouses and children must meet to qualify for cancellation of removal and
adjustment of status).
242. Id. sec. 1229(b)(2)(C).
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under Article 3 of CAT are not inadmissible criminals or security
risks under INA section 212.243 Domestic violence victims who re-
ceive withholding of removal under Article 3 of CAT also are not
deportable criminals, security risks, or perpetrators of marriage fraud
under INA section 237.2' Moreover, for domestic violence victims
who received withholding of removal under Article 3 of CAT, the
United States already determined that it cannot return them to their
home countries.245 Ultimately, domestic violence victims forced to
flee to the United States to escape the egregious abuses that they suf-
fered in another country are still battered immigrant spouses. The
United States government should afford these domestic violence vic-
tims the same benefits currently available under INA section
240A(b)(2) by allowing domestic violence victims to adjust to LPR
status if they have qualified for withholding of removal under Article
3 of CAT.
CONCLUSION
Withholding of removal under Article 3 of CAT is an important
and viable alternative legal remedy for domestic violence victims
who have suffered particularly egregious abuse. While improvements
to ensure the accuracy, consistency, and fairness of CAT relief deci-
sions for domestic violence victims are still necessary, withholding
of removal under Article 3 of CAT provides domestic violence vic-
tims seeking asylum with an additional claim to argue. For domestic
violence victims who either do not qualify for asylum or have grants
of asylum revoked, such as Ms. Alvarado, withholding of removal
under Article 3 of CAT may save their lives by preventing the United
States from delivering them back into the hands of their abusers.
243. See id. sec. 1229(b)(2)(D) (explaining that while the battered spouse may
be inadmissible, it cannot be for INA section 212 reasons).
244. See 8 U.S.C.A. sec. 1229 (b)(2)(D) (precluding battered spouses deportable
under INA section 237 from qualifying for cancellation of removal and adjustment
of status under section 1229(b)(2)).
245. See supra notes 80, 86 and accompanying text (explaining that CAT pro-
hibits the United States government from returning persons granted withholding of
removal to risk countries).
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